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Abstract 
 
As the major shareholder, Malaysian Government in 2004 has embarked on the 
Government linked Companies (GLCs) transformation policy program that mainly 
emphasizes on enhancing the corporate governance mechanisms of the State owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in order to enhance effectiveness of the board.  The paper aims to 
examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms as embedded in the 
transformation program on the practice of earnings management. In particular, the study 
uses data for two periods of time (pre and post transformation), and examine whether the 
period of post transformation policy has experienced any improvement of board 
monitoring role in curbing earnings management activities. The main findings show that 
there is an increase of earnings management activities in post transformation period. 
Further, the findings revealed that all corporate governance mechanisms have little 
impact to curb earnings management activities except for board meetings and leadership 
structure in the post transformation period. The board meetings and separate  role of two 
top positions in the companies were shown to have negative impact on earnings 
management post transformation policy and that relationship do not hold for the period 
pre transformation policy. Although the study has shown positive preliminary impact of 
tightening corporate governance in GLCs, scope to expand the research was also 
discussed. 
 
Key words: GLCs, Transformation Program, Corporate Governance, Earnings 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance has attracted a considerable attention from regulators, academician 
and practitioners due to the widely held belief that the corporate governance enhances 
investor goodwill and confidence and boosting the economic health of listed corporations 
(Coleman, 2006; Garg, 2007). Moreover, the corporate governance mechanisms have 
argued to affect the performance of corporate (Chuanrommanee and Swierczek, 2007) 
and contribute to the integrity of financial reporting process in different context of 
organizations (Petra, 2007). This is equally important for listed private and listed state 
owned corporations. Thus, as main mechanism in corporate governance, board has 
fiduciary responsibility to monitor management against opportunistic behaviors. 
However, the extent of corporate governance in general and board of directors 
particularly to safeguards shareholders depends on the effectiveness of the mechanisms. 
In this regards, many corporate governance recommendations and guidance have been 
issued to ensure that the board of directors perform its duty effectively.  
Malaysia as emerging market has issued with its own code of corporate 
governance in 2000 which revised by 2007 and should be followed by all listed 
companies. Nonetheless, Malaysian listed Government Linked Companies have been 
subject to criticisms concerning their role and performance in the Malaysian economy 
and have recently come under government scrutiny (Abdul-Aziz et al., 2007). The reason 
is that GLCs suffered recurring poor financial performance. Thus, the Malaysian 
government as major shareholder of listed government linked companies has embarked 
with new transformation policy to strengthen the governance system of its owned listed 
firms. The underlying principles of the policy are national development, performance 
focus and good governance as emphasized by Putrajaya Governance Committee.  One of 
the important thrusts of the policy is to upgrade the effectiveness of corporate governance 
of the GLCs through the improvement in certain board mechanisms that are suggested to 
have an impact on GLCs’ performance. In the GREEN BOOK of transformation policy, 
PGC has reinforced certain board characteristics such as board size, board meetings and 
multiple directorships as influential tools to make the board more effective in performing 
its oversight duties.  
The progress report of the transformation policy has shown that GLCs’ 
performance is on track which suggests that the GLCs are performing better in post 
transformation policy period. However, there is also a question of whether the GLCs are 
actually performing better or whether the improvement in performance is affected by the 
limitations of existing performance measurement (i.e. earnings management). With 
enhanced corporate governance mechanisms in place as clearly stated in the Green Book, 
it is expected that the GLC’s improved performance should commensurate with lower 
activity of earnings management. Thus, it would reflect the improved quality of reported 
earnings with strengthening of oversight functions of the Boards. This is the essence of 
corporate governance initiatives undertaken worldwide. Therefore, this study aims to 
investigate the impact of the transformation policy on the association between board 
characteristics and earnings management of the listed GLCs firms in Malaysia. In 
particular, the study will test whether enhancing corporate governance mechanisms is 
associated with lowering earnings management in the GLCs.  
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The main finding of the study shows that there is a moderate increase of earnings 
management activities in the post transformation policy year. Thus, this pose question on 
the quality of reported earnings of the GLCs.  Interestingly, the enhanced function of 
audit committee with the inclusion of financial expert seems to promote greater earnings 
management than otherwise. Nevertheless, we also find that board meetings and duality 
are related to lowering earning management and that relationship is stronger post 
transformation program.   
Thus, the paper proceeds as follows. The following section provides a detailed 
discussion on theoretical framework and hypotheses development.  Following a 
discussion on the research methodology, the results of the study are reported. The final 
section concludes the paper. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Earnings management  
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) propose that “Earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers’’. It is suggested that EM occurs due to various reasons, 
including influencing the capital market (Beneish, 2001; Healy and Wahlen,1999; 
Cormier et al.,1998); contracts written in terms of accounting number “lending contracts” 
(Othman and Zeghal, 2006; Bagnoli and Watts, 2000; Healy and Wahlen,1999); 
management compensation contract (Guidry et al. 1999; Holthausen et al., 1995); anti 
trust or other government regulation and political costs (Wilson and Shailer,2007; Key, 
1997; Watt and Zimmerman, 1986); effective tax rate and issuing equity; the existence of 
relative performance evaluation specifically when firms  expect  their competitor firms to 
manage earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) avoidance  of  earnings decreases and 
losses (Daniel et al., 2008) and meeting dividend thresholds, (Goncharoy and 
Zimmermann, 2006). 
As such there is widely belief that firms are motivated to engage in manipulation 
of their earnings and to involve in opportunistic behaviors (for example, Peasnell et al., 
2005; Klein, 2002; Chen et al., 2006; Abdul Rahman, 2006). Park and Shin view that 
earnings management range from fraud which violates the generally accepted principle to 
earnings management which can be approached within GAAP. For example, Daniel et al. 
(2008) illustrate that manipulating earnings though GAAP can be  exercised by 
accelerating the recognition of revenue, deferring the recognition of expenses, altering 
inventory accounting methods, changing estimates of bad debt, and revising assumptions 
related to pension assets. 
 
Earnings management and  Corporate Governance  
 
Earnings management is viewed as detrimental to firms’ value (Jiraporn et al., 
2008) due to impact the on financial reporting quality.  This is mainly because 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders will be higher and hence it has the 
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potential to decrease shareholders’ wealth (Park and shin, 2004) as the information will 
be less informative to shareholders (Teoh et al., 1998). Thus, the corporate governance 
mechanisms could mitigate the information asymmetry and reduce the divergence 
between shareholders and managers. In this regards, a large body of academic literature  
have  examined the impact of corporate governance variables on earnings management 
(see for examples, Park and shin, 2004; Xie et al., 2003; Dechow et al, 1996; Sarkar et 
al., 2006 Cornett et al, 2008). 
Certainly, the board of directors’ effectiveness can be linked to financial reporting 
quality in a way that the effective and active board can minimize the opportunistic 
behavior of unscrupulous managers, hence protecting the interest of shareholders. The 
Malaysian Companies’ Act 1965 and MASB statements emphasize the role and 
responsibility of the board of directors in ensuring that the financial statements are 
prepared in accordance with applicable accounting standards. Moreover, the board of 
directors should also perform its function effectively since compliance with accounting 
standards is not enough to ensure the absence of manipulation in financial statements 
(Saleh et al., 2005). Therefore, in order to handle its monitoring responsibilities 
effectively, it might depend in the so called  form of Corporate Governance (CG) like 
structure and composition (Peasnell et al., 2005) or it might rely on the substance of CG 
such as diligence and busyness of directors (Sakar et el., 2006; Chtourou et al., 2001). All 
such issues of governance were strongly emphasized in the GLCs transformation policy 
initiatives (PGC, 2006). 
 
Board composition 
The board of directors at the top of the monitoring system has the role of 
monitoring the top management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, to be an effective 
monitor, the board needs to include outside director members who are expected to behave 
independently of managers (Peasnell et al., 1998) and to bring greater breadth of 
experience to the firm (Cornett et al., 2008) as they are more willing to develop 
reputation in the labor market which depends basically on their performance on 
monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Kelin (2002) and Peasnell et al. (2005) find that 
board independence provides an essential tool to reduce the magnitude of earnings 
management. Although the vast majority of the research find negative relationships 
between board independence and EM suggesting that more NEDs there are as board 
members, EM activities will reduce, the literature tends to suggest mixed results. For 
instances, Abdul-Rahman and Ali (2006); Abdullah and Nasir (2004); Saleh et al. (2005) 
find that board independence has no impact in constraining earnings management. 
Meanwhile, Osma and Noguer (2007) find positive relationship. 
Thus, agency theory assumes that the association of independent directors and 
non-executive directors’ (NEDs) with EM is expected to be negative, and stronger post 
transformation policy as CG practices are more emphasized  following the transformation 
policy.  
 
Hypothesis1a: the negative association between the number of independent 
directors on the board and earnings management is stronger in post 
transformation policy period than before. 
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Hypothesis1b: the negative association between the number of non-executive  
directors on the board and earnings management is stronger in post 
transformation policy period than before. 
 
 Board size 
Despite the role of independence directors in oversight role, the board size is 
debated to have an impact on curbing earnings management activities, Jensen (1993) 
argues that a larger board is easier for the CEO to control and it is difficult for it to 
perform its role effectively due to communication and coordination problems. In such a 
weak board culture managers can make opportunistic choices to advance their self 
interests at the expense of shareholders (Vafeas, 2000). He further discusses the possible 
effect of each board size on financial reporting quality. He proposes that the smaller 
board can enhance the quality of financial reporting and hence information quality will be 
higher for those firms with a smaller board. This may be due to the possibility of the 
discussion of financial reporting numbers among the small board‘s members compared to 
the large board. Inversely, the larger board is expected to be less effective as the 
monitoring responsibility will be diffused among many directors which suggest that the 
burden will be less on each of them (Vafeas, 2000). This could be because of the less 
personal responsibility assumed by each director. While several authors find that smaller 
board size could enhance the quality of earnings (Beasley; 1996; Vafeas, 2000; Ahmed et 
al., 2006), others find no or negative relationship between board size and earnig directors 
and shareholder welfare (Chtourou et al., 2001; Xie et al., 2003; and Peasnell et al. 2001). 
Therefore, from the discussion above, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis2: The positive association between board size and earnings 
management is higher in post transformation policy period than before. 
 
 Board Leadership 
Agency theory dictates that having separated people on the top of the decision 
management function and control function helps in reducing the power of the CEO on the 
board (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Furthermore, the separation of the CEO and chairman 
strengthen the checks and balances in the top management of firms (Chen et al., 2006). 
Thus, it is argued that having two different persons on the top of control function (board) 
and execution function (management) could mitigate the agency problems and hence 
safeguards the interest of shareholders by decrement the earnings management activities. 
Supporting the agency theory perspective, Dechow et al(1996) find that firms with dual 
role are more subjecting to investigation by SEC SEC. Zarkar et al. (2003) find a positive 
relationship between duality and earnings management. The expectation is that the 
earnings management will be higher with combining the role of two top positions of the 
firms. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis3: The negative relationship between the non duality role and earnings 
management is higher in post transformation policy period than before. 
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 Board Meetings 
Vafeas (1999), Conger et al. (1998) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that the 
board of directors’ effectiveness is a function of time where board meetings reflect the 
board activity. From the agency perspective, it is contended that when the board 
demonstrates more diligence in discharging its responsibility, this will enhance the 
overall oversight of the financial reporting process (Carcello et al., 2002). Xie et al. 
(2003) opine that the more board meetings, the more time is devoted to issues such as 
EM and vice versa However, It is argued that the board activity is a function of firm size, 
where the larger the firm, the more complex the firm which, in turn, needs more time 
consumed in the decision making process due to the information complexity in such 
organizations (Vafeas, 1999). A positive relationship is find between fraud and multiple 
directorships (Chen et al., 2006). Other studies (Sarkar et al., 2006 and Xie et al., 2003) 
find negative relationship with DA. The expectation is that discretionary accruals will be 
less with an increase in the number of board meetings as agency theory suggests. 
Therefore the following negative hypothesis is stated: 
 
Hypothesis 4: the negative relationship between board meetings and earnings 
management is higher in post transformation policy period than before. 
 
Board multiple directorships 
There is a growing debate in the corporate governance literature on the 
membership of directors on multiple boards and its impact on the effectiveness of the 
monitoring function of the board of directors (Schnake and Williams, 2008). Ferris et al. 
(2003) advanced the busyness hypothesis which proposes that serving on multiple 
boards’ overcommitted individuals. In such a way, the directors with multiple 
directorships might serve less on board committees and hence the role of the board in 
oversight management will be reduced according to the busyness hypothesis. In empirical 
studies conducted by (Saleh et al. 2005; Chtourou et al, 2001), the results indicate 
negative relationship between earnings management and boards multiple directorship. In 
line with the e mpirical evidence and with the notion that firms whose directors have 
many directorships on other firms’ board are expected to perform less effectively and 
hence their ability to curb earnings management will be less likely, the following 
relationship is hypothesized:    
 
Hypothesis 5: Fewer board directorships lead to lower EM activities   in the post 
transformation policy period than before.  
 
 Audit Committee  
The audit committee has long been seen as a vital institution in assisting the board 
of directors in overseeing the transparency and integrity of the financial reporting process 
(Klein, 2002). According to Wild (1996), the primary assumption of the establishment of 
an audit committee is to enhance earnings and financial reporting quality. Thus, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee report (1999) and Securities and Exchange Commission report of 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 as well as PGC (2006) have emphasized the essential role of 
the audit committee in the financial reporting process and that can be achieved by 
improving the effectiveness of audit committee members through certain mechanisms, 
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including their independence, financial literacy and expertise and consuming sufficient 
time to meet regularly and discuss with the related parties. Empirically, Abbott et al. 
(2002) and Klien (2002) find that audit committee independence has negative 
relationship with misstatement and earnings management. On the other hand, Dhaliwal et 
al. (2006) find a positive relationship between only accounting expertise on the audit 
committee and accruals quality. Meanwhile, Lin et al. (2006) find no evidence on the 
relationship between financial expertise and meetings of the audit committee members 
and restatements. From the above discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The negative relationship between audit committee’s independence, 
financial expertise and frequency of committee meeting, and EM is higher in post 
transformation policy than before. 
 
Research design and variable measurement 
 
The sample examined in this study consists of all the Government Linked Companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia.  The sample period covers periods; the first period covers the 
year of 2003 and the second period runs over 2006. The first period represents the period 
before the Malaysian government restructured the companies under its control. The 
second period reflects the period following the transformation programme of the GLCs 
that the government launched in order to restructure the GLCs into high performing 
companies. In total, at the time of the 2006 annual reports there were 53 listed GLC 
firms. Of the 53 firms, firms in the financial sector were excluded from the sample since 
the finance industry is a highly regulated industry and the behaviour of earnings in 
finance sector is different from other sectors which require other methods to calculate the 
DA that cannot be captured by the modified Jones model (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; 
Peasnell et al., 2005; Saleh et al., 2005; Abduallah and Nasir,  2004; Park and Shin, 2004;  
Abdul Rahman and Abu Bakar, 2002; Kelin, 2002).  After excluding the finance sector, 
43 observations were available, of which, 8  either had missing data on the explanatory 
corporate governance variables or had insufficient data on Bloomberg database to enable 
an estimation of  DA, this leaving a final sample of 35 firm-year observations. 
 
Measuring earnings management 
 
While there are different models to estimate the discretionary accruals portion, 
Dechow et al. (1995) assess the performance of five models of calculating EM developed 
in the literature and conclude that a modified version of the Jones (1991) model by 
Dechow et al. (1995) provides the most powerful test of EM. Therefore, the modified 
Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) in its cross sectional version is adopted in this study.  
According to Peasnell et al. (2000), Bartov et al. (2001), Peasnell et al. (2001), and 
Subramanyam (1996) using a cross sectional model provides several  advantages over the 
counterpart time series model. While the time series Jones model assumes that coefficient 
estimates on changes in revenues and plant, property and equipment are stationary over 
time, the cross-sectional model assumes the changes cannot be stationary over time. 
Using the cross-sectional model will help to avoid the survivorship; The self reversing 
property of accruals may introduce specification problems in the form of serially 
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correlated residuals (Peasnell et al.,2000); Bartov et al. (2001) evaluate the power of 
various models of DA and they report that the cross-sectional Jones and the cross-
sectional modified Jones models perform better than their counterpart times series 
models; It generates a greater sample than time series data (Peasnell et al, 2001; 
Subramanyam, 1996) 
Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, the coefficient parameters for all 
other non sample firms in each industry are estimated separately using the original 
version of the Jones model, not from the modified model as shown in equation 1 ( Bartov 
et al., 2001; Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Ashbaugh et al., 2003). Further, in order to ensure 
unbiased estimation, each industry includes at least 10 observations which are consistent 
with prior research (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; Klein, 2002). 
Based on availability of data and industries in which the GLCs operate, the number of 
firm observations included to compute the coefficient parameters are highlighted in 
appendix 1. 
 
 
Equation 1 
 
 
 
 
Following  Daniel et al. (2008), Hribar and Collins (2002)  and Bradshaw et al. (2001), 
 is total accruals for firm i in industry k in year t, computed as the difference 
between net income before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations;  is 
gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in industry k in year t;  is the 
change in revenues for firm i in industry k between year t−1 and year t;  is error term 
for firm i in year t for industry and finally   are industry specific parameters 
coefficient. All variables are deflated by lagged assets,  
 to reduce heteroscedasticity. 
Using the estimated coefficients  from industry division regressions (Eq. 
(1), the researchers evaluate the non-discretionary components of total accruals, NDA, 
for each sample firm-year observation using the Jones modified cross sectional model as 
shown in equation 2;  
 
 
Equation 2 
 
 
Finally, the discretionary accruals proxy is obtained by calculating the difference 
between total accruals and estimated NDA as shown in equation (3) below; 
 
Equation 3 
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Data and model on Corporate governance 
 
Data on corporate governance variables are taken from proxy statements. All listed firms 
are required to disclose the information regarding corporate governance compliance in 
their annual reports. Beside corporate governance variables, two control variables have 
been used in the model namely firm size and leverage that are hypothesized by Watt and 
Zimmermann (1986) to have influence the accounting choices. Firm size is included to 
control for differences in firm size as the expectation is that firm size could explain to 
some extent the level of discretionary accruals in order to reduce the political sensitivity 
of regulators. While financial leverage is expected to influence the earnings management 
due to debt covenant. Table 1 shows the variables definitions  
To measure the strength of association between discretionary accruals and the 
explanatory variables was tested using a linear regression model. The dependent variable 
is a measure of discretionary accruals. The independent variables include measures of 
board corporate governance, and control variables. The model is used to test the 
association between discretionary accruals and explanatory variables before the period 
prior transformation and post transformation program as shown below 
 
 
 
Where, DA is discretionary accruals obtained from cross sectional modified Jones model. 
IND is independent directors, NEDs is non executive directors, Bsize is board size, 
Bmeet is board meetings, Dship is the directorships, Dual is the duality role, COMIND is 
the audit committee independence, ComMeet is the audit committee meetings, EXP is the 
financial expertise of audit audit committee, Fzie is firm size and LEV is the leverage.  
 
Table 1: Variables definition 
 
Variables Definition Operationalization Expected 
sign  
IND A proxy of Board 
independence  
Independent directors to total number 
of directors 
- 
NEDs A proxy of board 
independence  
Non executive directors to total 
numbers of director 
- 
Dual CEO-Chairman 
duality 
Dummy variable being 1CEO-
chariman duality, Zero, otherwise 
 
+ 
Bsize Board of directors 
size 
Total number of the directors + 
Bmeet Board meetings Number of meetings divided by 
number of directors 
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- 
Dship Number of seats on 
other board held by 
each directors 
Total number of outside directorship 
divided by number of directors 
 
+ 
Comind A proxy of 
independence  
% of independent directors on audit 
committee to total number of directors 
 
- 
ComMeet Audit committee 
meetings 
Numbers of meetings divided by 
number of audit committee members 
 
- 
EXP Financial expertise 
on audit committee 
Dummy variable equal 1 if at least one 
member is expert, Zero otherwise 
 
- 
Fsize Firm size  Total assets  + 
LEV Leverage  Total debt to total assets - 
 
Since multivariate regression is used to test the hypotheses, assumptions of 
normality, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity are also tested. The normality test is 
conducted using Skewness, Kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z. While Pearson 
correlation matrix and Variance Inflator Factor (VIF) are used to test the multicollinearity 
assumption, Levene Test is adopted to test the homogeneity of variances. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Since the focus of study is on the impact of transformation program, the model 
above is employed to examine both period. Table 2 Panel A presents the Pearson 
correlation matrix for the dependent and explanatory variables for the year 2003 prior 
transformation program. Meanwhile the Panel B presents the correlation matrix for 2006 
post transformation policy. It indicates no multicollinearity problem, as the correlations 
are relatively low. 
The analysis of homogeneity of variances revealed that no problem of 
homoscedasticity. As a rule of thumb, if the Levene test is significant (p < 0.05), the two 
variances are significantly different. If it is not (P > 0, 05), the two variances are not 
significantly different; that is, the two variances are approximately equal. Results of 
standard tests on skewness and kurtosis as well as  Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z indicate a 
problem with the normality assumption. Hence, the all variables are transformed into 
normal scores of van der Warden (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Leventis et al., 2005; 
Leventis and Caramanis, 2005). 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1                         
Panel A Pearson Correlation Matrix for 2003
    1 1)  DA 
          1 .054 2)  IND 
         1 .179 .124 3)  NEDs 
        1 -.026 .188 -.005 4)  Dual 
       1 -.254 .010 -.180 -.018 5)  Bsize 
      1 .480 -.160 .115 -.170 -.249 6)  Bmeet 
     1 .021 -.116 .170 .297 .289 -.014 7)  Dship 
    1 .650 -.161 -.008 .070 .47** .335 .075 8)  Comind 
   1 -.078 .030 .251 .020 -.045 .273 -.250 .080 9)  ComMeet 
  1 .030 .042 .050 .093 .158 .300 .213 .217 -.022 10) EXP 
 1 .060 -.003 -.300 -.030 .40** .130 -.030 .050 .100 -.060 11) Fsize 
1 0.23.040 -.015 .330 .510 -.004 -.060 -.015 .030 .620* .114 12) LEV 
   
                             Panel B Pearson Correlation Matrix for 2006
    1 1)  DA 
          1 -.060 2)  IND           
         1 .183 -.010 3)  NEDs         
        1 -.240 .030 -.200 4)  Dual           
       1 -.130 -.120 -.06 -.010 5)  Bsize         
      1 .150 -.200 .120 -.001 -.52* 6)  Bmeet        
     1 .008 -.140 -.260 .120 .164 -.35** 7)  Dship         
    1 .150 .20*.060 .020 .070 .521 -.120 8) Comind      
   1 -.029.070 .55* .050 -.070 .170 .521 -.54* 9) ComMeet   
  1 -.010 .090.110 -.150 .110 .030 .150 .210 .270 10) EXP          
 1 .05.40* .180 .010 .55 .120 .002 .020 .231 -.160 11) Fsize         
1 .230 .09.190 .070.190 -.09 .020 -.020 .100 .268 -.220 12) LEV          
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics. The Table displays an increase of EM activities in 
the post transformation policy year with an absolute discretionary accrual (ABSDA)/total 
assets ratio for 2006 of 8.14% as compared to a lower ABSDA/total asset ratio of 6.86% 
in 2003. However, the paired sample T-test indicates DA have not experienced any 
statistically significant changes in post transformation programme as compared to the pre 
transformation policy year. Despite that, the descriptive statistics indicates that the 
transformation policy failed to curb EM activities. For explanatory variables relating to 
compliance to the transformation policy requirements, findings on board size, number of 
meetings and directorships will be highlighted as these are specific changes required by 
the policy.  It can be seen in Table that the size of the board (Bsize) across the sample in 
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year 2003 ranges from 6 to 14 with a mean of 8 directors, whereas the board size for year 
2006 ranges from 5 to 12 directors with a mean of 8 directors which meets the 
requirements made in the transformation programe in 2004. The board requirement 
indicates that the board size should not exceed 10 directors. On average, the board size 
for the overall sample is considered the same for the year 2003 and 2006. 
 The board during the year 2003 on average meets 7 times. The minimum number 
of meetings held in year 2003 was about approximately four meetings, while the 
maximum was about 15 meetings.  Referring to the year 2006, it is found that the mean 
number of meetings increased to eight meetings with one more meeting as compared to 
2003. It seems from the average that sample firms are in compliance with the PGC 
requirements of at least six meetings held each year. The maximum number of meetings 
held for 2006 is about 17 meetings which can be considered very high. However, the 
minimum meetings held per year indicate that at least one firm met only three times – 
something which is considered a violation of the requirements. The mean value of non 
executive directors on the board is about 8 directors, which indicates that board size of 
the most of companies comprise a majority of non executives directors. However, there is 
not much difference between 2003 (0.85) and 2006 (0.87). Meanwhile, the statistics 
about board independence in 2003 indicate the mean value for board independence is 
about 0.40 which is considered quite similar for the mean 0.41 of 2006. The minimum 
value of board independence is about 0.29 and 0.33 for 2003 and 2006 respectively and 
the maximum is about 75% and 63% respectively. This suggests that, the GLCs in 2003 
did not follow the requirements of Bursa Malaysia for one-third of directors should be 
independent. This could be due to the fact that government connected firms have negative 
relationship with compliance (Ahmed et al., 2008). However, in 2006, the firms met one-
third of the regulatory requirement of Bursa Malaysia emphasized in the PGC 
requirements for transforming the GLCs into high performing firms. 
 Each director in the sample has on average three board seats on other listed 
companies in the year 2003. The maximum number of directorships held on other boards 
is seven seats. Similarly, in 2006 each director held an average of three seats on other 
listed companies with the maximum of five directorships on other boards.  This shows 
that the directors met the requirement made by the PGC on the maximum cap of 
directorships on other boards, which are five directorships on listed firms  
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Regression Results 
 
Table 4 reports the results from the regression equation linking corporate governance and 
discretionary accruals. As shown in the left side of the table below, the adjusted R2 is 
about 29 % which is an acceptable level. F value 7.51 and the significant level is 0.002. 
Generally speaking, the findings indicate that all corporate governance variables were not 
significant in affecting earnings manipulation in the year of 2003. The significant 
variables were firm size and leverage at 1% level of significance with a positive 
relationship with DA, which indicates that larger firms are more inclined to engage in 
EM activities. This finding is not consistent with the negative relationship documented in 
Abdul Rahim and Ali (2005). The positive sign reported in this study does support the 
political cost hypothesis of Watts and Zimmermann (1986) in which larger firms are 
subject to more scrutiny and hence engage in earnings manipulation downwards to reduce 
the political and regulatory costs. Another possible explanation for positive relationship 
could be the threat of delisting (Ding et al., 2007) since the GLCs are viewed to perform 
poorer than other companies (PGC, 2006). Besides, Park and Shin (2004) opine that 
when unmanaged earnings are below the target earnings, positive abnormal accruals are 
taken to increase the reported earnings and vice versa. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on continuous variables 
 
Minimum Maximum Std deviation Mean Variables 20062003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 
.004 .002 27 24 6.2 5.4 8.14 6.86 DA 
33 29 63 75 .075 .091 41 40 IND 
50 50 100 100 11 11.2 87.5 85 NEDs 
5 6 12 14 1.47 1.84 8 8 Bsize  
3.25 3.5 17.6 14.9 3.87 3.47 8.5 6.9 Bmeet 
0.75 0.14 5.5 7.11 1.32 1.37 2.91 3.15 Dship 
60 33 100 100 0.13 .126 75 69 Comind  
3.25 2 17.6 13 2.21 2.21 5 5.3 ComMeet 
94.8 84.7 80148 71479 1699 1459 7939 6821 Fsize 
102 -857 2389 385 540 684 380 310 LEV 
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Table 4: Multiple regression result between DA and Corporate governance 
mechanism variables  
 DA 2003 DA 2006 
Variable  β t-value t-sig. VIF Β t-value t-sig. VIF 
     
IND .161 .980 .335 1.209 -.138 -1.286 .209 1.066 
NEDs .034 .221 .826 1.002 .106 .956 .347 1.127 
Bsize -.020 -.130 .897 1.033 .  122  1.089 .285 1.158 
Dual .040 -.264 .794 1.009 -3.787 -3.787 .001* 1.060 
Bmeet -.229 -1.516 .140 1.071 -.321 -2.919 .007* 1.102 
Dship .019 .122 .904 1.108 -.152 -1.402 .172 1.102 
Comind .012 .081 .936 1.022 -.095 -.866 .394 1.085 
ComMeet .191 1.155 .258 1.248 .083 .589 .561 1.760 
EXP .020 .131 .896 1.009 2.746 2.746 .010* 1.027 
Control var.          
Fsize .519 3.427 .002 1.031 6.642 6.642 .000* 1.049 
LEV -.361 -2.386 .024 1.031 -.121 -1.145 .262 1.030 
 
Adjusted R2 
F value 
F significant 
 
.29 
7.51 
.002  
 
.638 
15.524 
.000 
 
 
 In contrast to firm size, leverage is also found to have a significant (5%) negative 
relationship with earnings manipulation. In other words, higher leverage leads to a lower 
level of earnings manipulation. The results do not confirm to the debt covenants 
hypothesis of Watts and Zimmermann (1986) and the findings of DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) which indicates that higher leveraged firms are more motivated to engage in 
earnings manipulation in order to avoid debt covenant violation. However, this study 
documented a negative association between leverage and EM. Park and Shin (2004) 
stated that when the firm is highly indebted, it may become less able to practice EM 
because they are under the close scrutiny of lenders. In the case of GLCs where the 
funding comes from the government there should be scrutiny from the government 
instead of lenders leading to inhibition of EM.  
 Table 4 also shows the result of regression for 2006 on the left side. At a first 
glance, the results show a slight improvement in corporate governance effectiveness in 
2006 compared to 2003. The adjusted R2 is about 0.638 which is very high compared to  
other EM studies. F value is 15.52 and the significance level is 0.000. These statistics 
indicate the improvement in the documented results.  However, the table indicated that 
board independence; non executive directors, board size, directorships, committee 
independence, committee meetings have no significant relationship with discretionary 
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accruals post transformation policy which suggest that the hypothesized relationship of 
stronger impact of these variables on earnings management post transformation is not 
supported. Thus, the related hypotheses are not supported.  
 Duality has been shown to have a negative significant (1%) impact on EM 
indicating that separating the role of CEO and chairman of the board has an effective role 
in curbing EM. The result is similar to Klein (2002) and does have support in the agency 
theory. The agency theory suggests that the separation of the role of decision making 
from the control process leads to reduction in the power of the CEO and enables better 
monitoring by the board (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, this result provides support for 
hypothesis three. 
 Another explanatory variable that found to have a significant (1%) negative 
relationship with DA is board meetings. The result confirms Xie et al. (2003) findings 
which found that an active board is negatively related to the level of earnings 
management. This implies that a more active board is associated with a reduced level of 
DA (Xie et al., 2003). A board that meets more often should be able to devote more time 
to issues such as EM. A board that seldom meets may not focus on these issues and may 
perhaps only “rubber-stamp management plan” (Xie et al., 2003). The results are 
consistent with the expectation; hence, hypothesis five is not rejected. 
 The presence of financial experts is found to have a significant (1%) positive 
relationship with EM. The result is in contrast with the wisdom that outside directors may 
have the intention to curb EM and only those with financial expertise may be able to do 
so (Park and Shin, 2004). The results of the study are not consistent with Park and Shin 
(2004), Choi et al. (2007), and Chtourou et al. (2001). The plausible explanation for the 
positive relationship between the presence of expertise on audit committee and EM is that 
the establishment of an audit committee in listed companies in Malaysia has yet to 
achieve success in its monitoring role (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006). However, the clear 
reason for this relationship that is the lack of independence (Defond et al., 2005). Among 
the control variables firm size is reported to have a positive significant (1%) relationship 
with EM which is consistent with 2003.  
 It is noteworthy to report that the relationship between board meetings and DA is 
negative and that suggests the more meetings the less DA. In the same time, the 
relationship between firm size and DA is positively related showing that the larger firms 
have higher DA. Taken these two results together indicates a contradiction since the 
correlation between board meetings and firm size is positive.  Therefore, the researchers 
partitioned the firms into two groups. The results of the test revealed that board meetings 
are only negatively significant with small firm size. 
 To achieve a better understanding of the changes in the results in 2003 compared 
to 2006, the regression based on the changes in DA and related explanatory variables is 
ran. The results of the regression model are shown in Table  5 revealing that Adjusted R2 
is 10.3 % and F value is 4.78 at the level of 5 % significance. All variables of corporate 
governance were reported to have a non significant relationship with EM except for 
duality. Duality has negative significant (10%) impact on EM. Separation of the role of 
the CEO and chairperson leads to curbing EM activities due to reducing the power of the 
CEO. Leverage as a control variable was revealed to have an insignificant association 
with DA. Firm size is a significant (5%) variable and the relationship is positive with DA.  
This implies that the larger the firm size, the higher the activity of EM. The underlying 
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reason for such a relationship is that the larger firms come under scrutiny as suggested by 
the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmeramnn, 1986). Moreover, the larger firms 
may use the manipulation of earnings to reduce the tax burden.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Multiple regression results on changes 
in DA and Independent variables 
 Changes in DA 
Variable  β t-value t-sig. VIF
     
IND -.122 -.728 .472 1.018 
NEDs -.118 -.694 .493 1.045 
Dual -.287 -1.782 .084*** 1.021 
Bsize .005 2.188 .974 1.011 
Bmeet -.260 -1.615 .116 1.001 
Dship -.145 -.806 .427 1.181 
Comind .119 .644 .525 1.236 
ComMeet -.227 -1.348 .188 1.069 
EXP -.276 -1.639 .111 1.100 
Control var.      
Fsize .361 2.188 .036** 1.000 
LEV .126 .758 .454 1.000 
Adjusted R2 
F value 
F significant 
10.3 
4.78 
0.03 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of the study is to examine the association between earnings management 
and corporate governance characteristics in Malaysian government linked companies. 
Along with PGC recommendations on CG, the greatest concern has been directed and 
attached to board of directors’ effectiveness as the main mechanism in corporate 
governance. The underlying reasoning for such concerns is that following the best 
practices of corporate governance and board effectiveness, in particular, would result in a 
lessen EM activities. Many studies conducted in the field of corporate governance 
practices have shown results that contradicted with the assumption behind the corporate 
governance as many studies showed that following best practices did not provide an 
absolute assurance for lesser EM. Similarly, the case can be applied to GLCs, which 
means that following the transformation programme does not ensure better performance 
and less EM.  Thus, the main objective of this study   is to explore the impact of current 
practices of corporate governance, reflected in the transformation programme on 
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corporate performance and EM activities in GLCs to show whether the new government 
policy has had an impact earnings management activities for the year 2006 compared to 
the year 2003 before the issuance of the transformation policy.  
The study revealed that corporate governance variables and EM have no 
association with exception for the duality role and board meetings. The duality role has 
documented a negative relationship with EM which indicated that separating the role of 
the CEO and chairman leads to curtaining the EM activities. Consistently, board meetings 
have been revealed to affect EM negatively and the relationship is stronger post 
transformation policy. Such a relationship holds that any increase in board meetings leads 
to a reduction in EM activities for small companies only. Therefore, the expectation that 
is the transformation program is very essential to enhance the governance of GLCs and 
hence to curb the opportunistic behavior of earnings management seems to inaccurate 
This study has recognized some limitations. First, the main limitation of the study 
is that the data was collected through publicly available data sources such as annual 
reports and other databases. Other data could be helpful to gain more of an insight. This 
study opens avenues for future research by considering the impact of corporate 
governance using different variables such as competence of the directors, CEO tenure, 
directors’ qualifications and the interaction between corporate governance variables. The 
main implication for this study is that the government involved in regulating corporate 
governance for GLCs can use the results of the study as empirical support for the 
development of new regulations, recommendations and take the necessary corrective 
decisions regarding the effectiveness of the transformation policy.  
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Appendix 1 
 
No. Industry N 
1 Construction 50 
2 Customer service 50 
3 Industrial  81 
4 Plantation 18 
5 Properties 60 
6 Trade 24 
 Total 283 
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